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ABSTRACT
Paradoxical Leadership:
The Rise and Fall of Richard M. Ni_xon
Andrew P. Langins
2008
Non-thesis (MLs97) Project
This case study analyzes the leadership of the 37thpresident of the United States, Richard Nixon. Nixon was
elected during a time of uncertainty and turmoil in
America. He assumed a goal-oriented transactional/
transformational style of leadership and his first termpragmatic domestic policies had considerable success. For
example, despite a congress controlled by the opposition,
Nixon provj-ded massive funding to the arts, established the
Environmental Protection Agency, and expanded affirmatj-ve
acti-on. In f oreign af f airs he was the f irst U. S . president
to vi-sit communist China and the Sovi_et Union.
The key obstacle for Nixon's presidency was the
Vietnam War . Ul-t imatel y hi s criminal hehavior in Watergate
led to his resignation and his aspirations were defeated by
weakness of character.
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INTRODUCTION
The focus of this case study is to explore and analyze
the leadership style of Richard M. Nixon, thirty-seventh
President of the United States. Richard Nixon possessed
transactional/Lransformational leadership characteristics
as described by Max Weber in 1949 and further researched by
(1978). HeJames MacGregor Burns
displayed a pragmatic,
in his book Leadership
opportunistic style within a
transacLional-/ transformational leadership model. Nixon
employed the transactional leadership model of motivating
people hy reward and punishment in order to achieve his
domestic policy ref orms . Transf ormational- Ieaders, on the
other hand, "change the realities of Itheir ] particul-ar
world to more nearfy conform to [their] values and ideals"
(covey, 7991, p.285) . As Nixon progressed thru his career
the transformation from Transactional to Transformational
style became more apparent as he attempted to bring America
out of the Viet.nam War, to end confrontation, and strive
f or an era o f negot iat j-on .
This analysis will discuss the implications of Nixon's
leadership style change as it affected the man and his
career.
-6-
LTTURATT'RE REVIETT
In the twentieth century no other leader personified
the transactional-/ transformational leadership model with
as much complexity and dichotomy as Richard M. Nixon.
Aitken (1996) charact.erized Nixon as 'tthe contrast between
darkness and liqht' ( 1 ) . The auLhor stated, " [Nixon, s ]
private virtues, considerable though they were/ sometimes
confficted wit.h early pressures of his public career" (Z).
He felt that Nj-xon was unfairly treated as a wj-cked person
in public l-ife.by the methods he used to rapidly ascend
Aitken qualified his statement by quoting Dwight
Eisenhower's words when speaking of the A1ger Hlss case l_n
1951: t'The thing that surprised me most was that you not
only
good
law in the Hiss case as wel-l as the will of
party. Nixon's use of offensive political
a point, however, often caused ambivalence
of hls peers.
got Hiss, but you got him fairl-y" (2) .
transactional l-eader who carried out the
Nixon was a
letter of the
'*Livi-ng in the
presidency brought
7996, p. 4) . Nixon
of an'tunscrupulous
his political
rhetoric to make
and distancing
arena of presi-dential pofitics and the
changes in Nixon's character" (Aitken,
felt j ustif ied with his political_ ethic
player of hard bal-I" (Aitken , 1996,
-7 -
p. 4 ) . He was af f ected by watching "the deter j-orating
standards of the presidency during the 1960's. . [and
decidedl the way the game's gotta he played* (Aitken, 1996,
p.4 ) . Aitken stated, **Nixon had good instincts when he
spoke as president-efect of the need to 'bring us
togethe rt tt (4 ) . As President, Nixon played a
Lransformational leadership ro1e, developing domestic and
foreign policies. The President could not brlng the
country together, however. * [Nixon had] the right strategy
but [he] was the wronq man to make it work" (Aitken , 7996,
p.4). The President allowed himself to be corrupted by the
power of his of f j-ce. Instead of allowing his basic system
of values to work for him, Nixon used bad judgment and took
reckles s gambl-e s to achieve hi s ends . t' [Nixon ] came to
believe that the President was impregnable under the l-aw"
(Aitken, 7996, p.5) .
In the final analysis, Aitken felt that Nixon's
leadership was too harshly criticized in light of hls
strong virtues of t'international- ideali-sm and his Iifelong
dedication to racial equality" (Aitken, 7996, p.5).
discussed theA study by
difficulties of
on the back of
previous regime
Beland and Waddan (2006)
pre-emptive l-eadership. Nixon was "elected
short term public disapproval of the
that reversed the underlying ideological
-8-
and pofitical currents" (p.65) . Under difficult
circumstances, with only a l-imited mandate, Nixon tried to
work with the Republican Party. Accordlng to (Kotlowski,
2001, p, 3), he was *'persuIing] a strategy of 'moderation'
in order 'Lo unify the GOP' as 1t was clear that the 'party
woui-d never gain ma j ority status if either 1ts liberal- or
conservative wing was 'sliced off"' (as cited in B6land and
Waddan , 2006, p. 70 ) . Nixon' s work to unify his party, in
order to bring about reforms, had limited success. The
President's Family Assistance Plan alienated conservatives
who feared ttundermining work ethics and traditional family
values" (B61and and Waddan, 2006, p. 73) . The plan passed
Financein the House, but was stopped in the Senate
Committee. Nixon' s creative social legislation did not
the traditional- ideological
boundaries. Nixon is remembered for the scandals, but must
also be credj-ted with visionary transformational
leadership.
Mazlish (1970) stated, *'Nixon defines a leader as one
able to act in a crisis" (BB1 . Nixon al-so stressed, '*a
Ieader wi-thout a crisls is almost a contradiction in terms"
(88). Richard Nixon created crisis to succeed in securing
a Congressional and Senate seat. He felt that "crisis
enhances a leader in the eyes of his followers" (88). For
pass because it was outside
-9 -
most encounters he faced, Nixon prepared well- but faced the
agony of indecision: "whether or not Ito] release the
aggressive impulse" ( 90 ) . After the fight or release of
aggression, t'1et down, guilt, and self j ustif ication
followed" ( 90 ) . Nixon rose rapidly to the Presidency by
following this crisis pattern.
Rlchard Nixon's leadership by crisis helped to advance
his early political career/ servJ-ng him we 11, but clouded
when making decisions andhis judgment as President,
solving problems required the advice of others 
-
The study by McAndrews (1998) discussed Richard
Nj-xon's stand on school desegregation between the early
1 950' s and 1 97 0' s when Nixon was Vice President, and
President. Nixon's views can be traced to his mother' s
belief in equality between races. The President, who
attended Duke Univers i-ty in the Jim Crow South / corrmitted
himsel-f to one nation. As Vice President he endorsed the
Brown vs. Board of Education decj-sion of L954, lobbied hard
for the Civil Rlghts Act of 1957 and 1960, and spearheaded
the Eisenhower Administration's effort to eliminate
discrimination in the issuance of government contracls (p.
L92) .
After winning the 1968 Presidential election, Nixon
began a *tcalcul-ated wafflIing]" (p.19a) on desegreqation
- 10 -
due to a mixture of principfe and polltical concerns.
According to McAndrews, Nixon was not
people of the South, but al so st.ood by
mandate of racial desegregation.
As vice president, Nixon took his
willing to antagonize
the constitutional
rol-e as
transactional leader seriouslyr fldking firm decisions. As
President, he acted more in the rol-e of a political
tactician or pragmatist than a visionary transformational
leader.
Richard Nixon was a good manager in his early career
and as Vice President. As Presi-dent his leadership style
expanded
Thi s
to that of transactional/ transformational leader.
paper will expand on the l iterature revi-ewed . It
will discuss how Nj-xon, wit.h a torturous and someurhat
authoritarian personality, carried out the functions of the
highest office in the country.
Transactional.,/Transformational. Leadership Theory
According to James MacGregor Burns, t'Leadershj-p is one
of the most observed and l-east understood phenomena on
earth" (Burns, 197B, p. 2). Burns reasoned that leadership
has character j-stics of power but unli ke plain power, it
cannot be separated f rom follower interact j-on. *A1l
leaders are actual or potential- power holders, but not all
- l1-
, Augsburg Cr;liege l*iDratI'
power holders are leaders" (Burns, L978, p. 18) . "Some
define leadership as leaders making followers do what
fol-lowers woul-d not otherwise do, or as leaders making
followers do what the leaders want them to do" ( Burns,
7918 , p. 19 ) . This view is one sided, sel-f limiting and
often transitory. rt serves the purposes of the power
holder and not the group as a whore. Burns defines
l-eadership ds r
"leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals
that represent the values and the motivations-the
wants and needs, the aspirat j-ons and expectations-of
both l-eaders and followers. the essence of the
leader-follower relation is in the interaction of
persons with different levels of motivations and of
power potential, including ski1l, in pursuit of a
coflrmon or at least joint purpose (Burns, 1-978, p. 19) .
This communi-cation manifests in two forms/ Transactional
style and Transformational- styIe.
Transactional leadership is based on a transaction, or
the exchange of something of value the leader possesses or
contro]s that the f ol-l-ower want s in reLurn f or his /her
services: a style based on basic reward and punishment. It
is most effective when a cl-ear chain of command is needed.
If performance expectations are carried out in a normal
-12-
manner, leaders do not interfere. rf expectations are
applied for performance
goals are satisfied, new
Transactional- leaders have three characteristics.
exceeded, praise and
increased benefits )
reward (merit salary adjustments/
are given, Corrective action is
bel-ow expectations. When basic
higher order goals can he set.
wit.h team members to determi_ne
and ma ke certa j-n workers get
for achieving those goa1s. Second,
rewards (and promi-ses of rewards ) for
Third, t.hey respond to the lmmediate
o f f ol- lowers whose interest s can be
First, they work
unequlvocal goals
promised rewards
they exchange
worker effort.
self-interests
met whife being done. So, transactional
leadership
opportunity I a
reciprocat ing"
the job is
invol-ves
good hand at
( Burns , lgJ B t
specified exchanges
relationship between
2003, p.37)
of effort for
reward and a close goals and
rewards . ( Bryant,
Transactional l-eadership "requires a shrewd eye for
of directiveness and acti_on
bargaining, p€rsuading,
p.169) . This leadership style
orientati-on is often associated
with the milltary and governmenL leaders such as President
Char1es de Gaulle of France and Presldent Lyndon Johnson
when he was a legislative feader.
-13-
"Transforming leadership occurs when one or more
persons engage with others in such a way that leaders
and fol-l-owers raise one another to higher levels of
motivation and morality. Their purposes, whlch might
have started out as separate but related, ds in the
case of transactional leadership, become fused, Power
bases are l-inked not as counterweights but as mutual
support for coflImon purpose. Various names are used
for such leadership, some of them derj-sory: elevati.g,
mobil_:-zing, inspiring, exalting, upfifting, preaching,
exhorting, evangef i zing . The rel_ati_onship can be
moral j-stic, of course. But transforming l-eadership
ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level
of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader
and l-ed, and thus it has a transforming effect on
both." (Burns, 1978, p. 20)
Transformational l-eadership takes effect. when the merits of
transactional leadership are exhausted. Eollowers are now
at a skill- l-evel where they can be raised morally and
motivationally. rnstead of motivating by reward and
punishment, transformational leaders serve as mentors and
coaches, inspiring followership. These leaders, who may be
found at all levels of an organization, seek to improve
-14-
others. They inspire followers to use their unique skills
and tal-ents for a higher purpose. Transformational leaders
*'change the realities of Itheir] particu]ar world to more
nearly conform to [their] values and idea.l- s " (Covey , 1992 ,
leaders, generally withinp .28 5 ) . To Burns, trans forming
social movements, politics r or
followers to elevate the values
executives, connect with
of the followers to a
higher level . Bernard Bass ( 1 98 5 ) modified Burns' concept
of transforming leader to Transformational leadership,
which focuses more on the character of the Leader rather
than the process in which the leader particlpates. For
Bass, transformational leaders increase followers,
confidence in themselves as well as their expectati-ons of
success. Today transforrnational leadership is the term
most commonly used in discussions of leadership.
Po].itics l{ith Restraint 1953-1961
From the beginnlng of his political career, Nixon
assumed his transactional- leadership role with enthusiasm.
As Vice President under Eisenhower he energetically
accepted the Eisenhower Administration poli-cies. When a
question of policy did arise Nixon followed the President's
l-ead. According to Hatf ield, because "N j-xon coul-d perform
smoothly j-n the several roles that Ei senhower needed
-15-
fill-ed, he was able to cultivate the j-mage of an active and
important Vice President" (Hatfield, 7997, p. 437) .
Eisenhower delegated most disagreeable tasks to Nixon.
This started when he was asked to contain Senator Joseph
McCarthy's criticism of the administration for being too
soft on communism. Nixon successfully contained the
at.tacks by devising a strategy that led eventually to
McCarthy being censured by his own colleagues.
Another immediate order of business for the Vice
President was to help the administrati-on defeat the Bricker
Amendment. Republican Senalor John Bricker, concerned that
a U. S. President could compromise the sovereignty of the
United States by enterlng into agreements with fore i gn
to limit
of Congress
support in
naLions, introduced a constitutlonal amendment
that pos s ibi l ity and to increas e the inf l-uence
in making foreign policy. Despite
Congress, Eisenhower f elt that t.he
Republ j- can
amendment would
seriously restrict the necessary powers of the President
and make the nation *'helpless in world affairs" (Hatfield,
1997, p. 437) . The President, however, was unwilling to
take the role of the party's spokesperson, sending Nj_xon
and others to broker a compromi se with Br j-c ker . When the
Senator would not comply, Nixon actively lobhied for a l-ess
- 16 -
vigorous substitute, which passed without splitting the
party.
Aside from managing special assignments, Nj-xon was the
administration's political expert. He atten,Ced Cabinet
meetings and contributed his insights on the j-mport.ance of
selling the Republican Party to the publ-ic. The vice
President was careful- not to propose major objectives, but
only suggested methods,
A Vice Presidential
foresee was temporarily
responsihitities. Nixon
activity that Nixon did not
assuming presidential
provided the necessary leadership
Eisenhower' s team approach,
to l-ead during Eisenhower' s three
al-l- the while maintalning
leading wj-thout appearing
medical absences.
it.s constitutional import.ance. By the
decided to run for reelection in 1956,
looking for a running mate with
It appeared that Rj-chard Nixon was an exemplary Vice-
Pre s ident and transact iona I ]eader in the Ei senhower
administration. His performance j-n of f ice helped to make
the role of Vice President more prominent and to enhance
time Eisenhower
however, he was
leadership quatities that
next decade. Eisenhower didcoufd carry the party j-nto the
not see the mature leadership qualities in Nixon. To
Eisenhower, the presidency belonged to statesmen not
-17-
partisan politic j-ans . Nixon, understanding the President' s
motives and t.he tremendous potential for advancement in the
Vice Presidency, went to Eisenhower stating his interest in
being the President's running mate in the next election.
In order to gain full- party support, Eisenhower chose Nixon
and again easily won the election.
Nixon expanded the duties and vislbility of the Vice
President. The Republ- j-can Party noticed his political
astuteness and ability as an effective campaigner. Nixon
used these skills to begin to building a stage for his
greater ambitions. The Vice President continued to fulfill
his obl-lgations, but he was also setting his eyes on the
next prlze I the White House.
*'Of the f ive pres idential campaigns in which i he I was
a direct participant, none affected {Richard NixonI more
personally than the campaign of 7960" (Nixon, lgg0, p.
2L4). The Vice President's reputation was tied to
the Eisenhower Admini-stration, however, which his rival
Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the Democrats easily
attacked. Nixon had advocated a tax cut to stimulate the
economy, but Eisenhower wanted a balanced budget. The Vice
President al-so fought for increased defense expendltures
- l8 -
and an invasion of Cuba, which the President refused.
Although Nixon was successfuf
nominatlon and t'had travel_ed
in winning the Republican
over 65,000 miles and
visited all fifty states" (Nixon, 1990, p. 223), the
election appeared to hinge on a weak Republican Party base,
having to campaign
administration, and
in the shadow of Eisenhower's popular
the television debates. Eisenhower, s
heart condition did not allow him to defend his
Adminlstration. His support of Nixon was in question:
had contributed as*[W]hen asked what major ideas lNixon]
vice President: [Eisenhower replied] 'rf you give me a
week, f might think of one"' (Nlxon, 1990, p. Zlg) .
The Nixon-Kennedy Debates, vlewed for the first time
on television, drew much more interest than radio. The
public were swayed by the candldates appearance, rather
than their knowledge of subject matter. Nixon also could
not discuss cl-assified administration matters that were
introduced by Kennedy. rn the end Kennedy's "victory
margin was a mere half a percent. . ." (Greenstein, 2004,
the electj-on [Nixon] was
woul-d do next af ter I hi s ]
p.63) . "Within a few days after
already thinking about what Ihe]
fourteen years in public l-ife came to an end on January 20,
7961" (Nixon, 1,990, p. 221 ).
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The Private Citizen 1961-1957
Richard Nixon spent a large part of 19 61 writ.ing his
book Srx Crises and considering hls next career move. He
returned to California to run against Governor Edmund (Pat)
Brown. Thls t j-me, unlike the campaigns of 1946 and 1950,
Nixon needed to master California issues of which he had
1itt.1e knowl-edge or interest. Many Californians speculated
that the former Vice Presldent's attraction to the
governorship was a
the other hand, was
prelude for the Presidency. Brown, oD
a popular, approachable governor who
understood the needs of his const j-tuents. *Nixon lost by
close to three hundred thousand votes out of six million"
(Dallek, 2001, p. 29) . In a post election news conference,
Nixon said to what he felt was a hostil-e liberal press:
Just think how much you' re going to be mj- s s ing . You
won/t have Nixon to kick around anymoref because,
gentlemen, this is my last press conference, and it
will be one which I have welcomed the opportunity to
test wits with you (Black, 200'7 , p. 442) .
Nixon then smiled, waved and left.
Rj-chard Nj-xon never seriously considered leaving
politics and public
only way he had ever
servr-ce. To Nixon, "politics was the
been 'someore,' and though the risks
of permanently l-osing that identity were considerable, he
-20 -
coul-d not give up a l-ast chance to reach his lif e' s goa1"
(Da11ek , 200J , p. 32) . When he f elt emotional de j ect j-on
Nixon would remember his mother telling him from her
deathbed: "Richard, don't you give up. Don't let anybody
tel-l you you are through" (Nixon , L990 , p. 289) . From 19 63
to 7968, Nixon calculated his activities to be within the
time frame of the 1968 presidential nomination. He
traveled abroad extensively visiting Europe, Asia, the
Middle East, and Af rica meeting with worl-d l-eaders and
gaining an expertise in international concerns. At home
Nixon a l- so t ravel-ed throughout the f i f ty staLes becoming
acquainted with and cultivating
Republican leaders as possible.
a rapport with as many
conversant with every conceivable
t'Nixon was ext remely
domestic and foreign
of a tactical than aissue, but he seemed always more
conviction politician, except sometimes in matters of war
and patriotism" (Black, 2001, p.486) . The former Vice
Presldent'tMatured in the sense of coming to grips with his
fear of failure and his death wishes toward the fat.her-
figure Eisenhower" (Mazl-ish, L910, p.103). He returned to
become a successful- Eastern corporation lawyer. $ixon
stood bac k in the 7964 pres ident ial electi-ons when
President Lyndon Johnson decisively defeated
-2t -
ult.raconservatlve Barry Gol-dwater. He regarded his
decision as t'the single most important step that he took on
his return to power during [his years out of office]"
(Johns, !999, p.3). The defeat allowed Nixon to hecome the
party's unifier. He campaigned tirelessly for the
Republican Part.y and was rewarded with the party's success
in the 1956 congressional- elections r attracting increasing
sold himself withpress attention and funding. Nixon
expertise in foreign af faj-rs.
The former Vice President foresaw the Vietnam War as
the main j-ssue in the 1968 campaign. Johnson' s commitment
of over five hundred thousand troops by that year gave
Nixon, who thrived on oppositionr a central theme. As a
private citizen, Nixon constantly criticj-zed Johnson's
Vietnam policy. "As a respected voice in foreign affairs
and as arguably the Republican Party's leading spokesman on
Vietnam, Nixon forced the Administ.raLion to acknowledge and
respond to his rhetoric, which spurred Johnson to greater
involvement in the war" (Johns. 1999, p.1). Nixon saw
himself in a no l-ose situation with his stance on the war.
If America would make concessions or withdraw, Nlxon coufd
blame Johnson for his failures. If the United States
escal-ated and became victorious, Nixon could paint himself
n.)
AS having had the solutions. Either way Nixon wanted to
free himself from the 'loser' image.
On January 15, 1 9 58 , Nixon announced
family and friends that he had decided to
Because of his tactj-cs durlng the Johnson
to his cl-osest
run again.
administration,
the former Vice President was partially responsible for the
Vietnam situation he inherited when he assumed the
Presidency.
The National Stage
The 1968 election year looked good for Republicans.
Desplte Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory over Goldwater
:_n 1964, the Vietnam War and urban unrest sharpfy reduced
Johnson' s popularity. Nj-xon assembled media consul-tants,
among those H.R. "Bob" Haldeman, who helped him create a
new image. Nixon became more statesman-1j-ke, mature and
less combative. Television was used extensively to reach
large audiences using question and answer formats. Nixon
stood alone without. a podium answering questions from an
audience surroundlng him in tiered bleachers. He also took
pains not to antagontze medla. Richard Nixon was preparing
himsel-f for a new role as President and transformational
leader of his country. At the Republican Party Convention,
-zJ-
Nixon won the nomination on the first bal1ot, with Maryland
Governor Spiro T. Agnew as his running mate.
fn his acceptance speech, Nixon described the problems
in America as he saw them. He blamed American failures in
ending the war in Vietnam, the troubled economyf
lawl-essness, racial violence and hostilities against
Amerj-cans abroad on the country' s leadership. The
Republican nominee accepted the
leadership for America.
The Republican Convention
challenge to provide new
was orderly/ compared t.o the
tremendous disturbance of the Democratic gathering in
Democratic Party.Chicago. The Vietnam War had split the
Ant iwar cand j-date Eugene McCart.hy had gained enough support
in the New Hampshire primary to cause Johnson's withdrawal
from the race on March 31. Robert Kennedy then entered thg
race, winning the California primary in June and l-osing his
life to an assassin' s bulIet the same night.
A,Cministration loyalists who nominated Hubert H. Humphrey
as their candidate defeated antiwar demonstrators at the
convent ion .
Nixon campaigned against Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey
and thlrd party candidate George Wallace on a vague
plat f orm promising an honorabl-e peace in Vietnam with a
secret plan to end the war. He also promised to restore
-24 -
law and order in cities, crack down on i1Iegal drugs, and
end the military draft.
Richard Nixon's general e1ection campaign started with
a sizable lead over Humphrey. His refusal to debate
Humphrey and his success in urging South Vietnam to refuse
taking part in peace talks proposed by the administration
helped him to a narrow victory. t'The final returns of the
19 68 pres j-dential election showed that [Ni-xon] had def eated
Humphrey by only 500,000 votes (Nixon, 1990, p. 351), a
margin of less than one percent of the vote. Nixon also
became the first president elected without his party
winning either House of Congress since the nineteenth
century.
on January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon became the 37th
President of the United States. He had been in politics
over twenty-two years as a Congressman, Vice President, and
now Pres ident . Nixon had evolved f rom an int.ense
anticommunj-st/opportunist to a transactional leader as Vice
President, and now hoped to take on the role of a
trans f ormational l_eader and peacemaker .
rn his First rnaugural Address, Nixon stated, r.The
greatest honor history can bestow is the titl_e of
peacemaker" (Nixon, 1969, para. g) . This statement
descrihed the kind of l-eader the new president envisioned
-25 -
himself becoming. In his address, Nixon discussed the
promise of equality for all racesf his helief in today's
youth, and the beauty of celebrating 't. . the basi-c
things- such as goodness, decency, l-ove, kindness" (NJ-xon,
!969, para . 23) .
Domestic Policy
Despite critics' expectations that Nixon woul-d have a
"do nothing" presidency in regards to domestic affairs, the
President had hopes to transfer the country's wealth frorn
conflicts abroad to the urgent needs at home. His interest
in politics was heavi-1y influenced by the lmportant reforms
in wel-f are pof icy, civ11 rights, the environment, and 1aw
enforcement.
After taking office, Nixon proposed a ful1
restructuring of the qovernment.
and sluggish federal- bureaucracy/
since the Frankl-in Roosevelt erar
entrepreneurship under mountains
He felt that the swollen
especially preval-ent
buried creat i-ve
of
dependence and handouts. He called
red tape and promoted
his new system'tNew
Federal-ism, " which diverted money and power away from the
federal government and directed it toward the states.
On the topic of civil rights, Nixon opposed school
busing. Nixon's calculated attempt to sl-ow school
-26-
desegregat j-on was manif est in his puhric poricy. The
President stated: t'It]ransportation of pupils heyond normal
geographic school zones for the purpose of achieving racial
balance wil-l not be required" (McAndrews, 1998, p.190).
HEW secretary Leon Panetta denounced the speech, s
*"perpetuation' of segregatj-on and tslick rational: zation
for retreat"' (McAndrews, 1998, 190). This was a sharp
rebuke, and not unwarranted. The southern strategy,
showing roots in the 1940's and popularized by Nlxon
strategist Kevin Phillips in his 1969 book The emerging
Repu,bi ican najority referred to methods used to win
elections in the South by explolting racial anxiety among
white votersr using race as a wedge issue. Nixon supported
this strategy which, with the help of strom Thurmond,
helped to secure hi s nomination and win the el-ect ion in
1968. viewed as reqressive by many, it targeted
disenfranchised whites by hiqhlighting racially charged
issues like bussing and desegregation. Many felt the
Republican Party was moving away from the center, with
Nixon leading the way. Despite this focus, the percentage
of all-black school-s during the Nixon Administration saw a
drast ic reductlon.
Nj-xon felt pressure from environmental and. consumer
groups
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and proposed legisl-at ion that created the Department
of Natural Resources,
Administration (OSHA)
Occupational Safety and Health
and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) . The clean Air Act of 1gT0 was perhaps
one of the most significant pieces of environmental
legislation ever passed (*Richard M. Nixon,,, 2008,
articl-e-214055, p. 5) .
Foreign Affairs
*'On the adminj-stration's third day in office INati-onaI
Security Advlsor Henry Kissingerl began implemenLing
Nixon's plan to ensure White House dominance of foreign
pol:-Cy" (Dal-Iek, 200J, p. 100). president Nixon organized
the Whlte House to protect his energy, time, and to protect
His mode ofagainst an inhospitabl-e political environment.
operation was secret I often without the permj-ssion or
knowledge of the State Department. The President's main
operative was Henry Kissingrer, whose inf luence over foreign
policy was possibly greater than any presidential- advisor
in history. Routine matters and administrative business
were left to chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, council to the
President, John Erlichman, and White House l-iaison, Charles
Col- son .
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In his First Inaugural- Address, the President
redef ined the Amer j-can role in the world by stating: t'After
a period of confronLation, w€ are entering an era of
negotiation (Nixon , 1969, para. 52 ) . Nixon I acti_ng as a
change agent,/transformati-onal leader, started a withdrawal-
of American troops from vietnam. Nixon felt that an
initial wit.hdrawal would gain public favor, dllowing the
U. S . to achleve an honorahle end to the Vietnam War. OnIy
with an end to the war woul-d Nixon be free to give proper
attention to other great international challenges.
Priorit j-es that the President and Kissinger identl f 1ed were
reduclng tensions with the Sov-iet Union, establishing
and promoting Middle East peacediplomatic ties
tal-ks.
On July 25,
with China,
1969, during a brief stay in Guam, the
President formally gave notice that the United States would
henceforth support democratic nations by providing them
financial and military aid, but not troops. The
announcement, which was the basis of Nixon's foreign
policy, became known as the Nj-xon Doctrine. rt was also
part of the President's promised secret means of winning
the war. Nixon introduced what would be called
*vietnamization," supporting south vietnam with money and
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equj-pment while gradually wlthdrawing Amerj-can soldj-ers
from combat. When the President. called for a cease-fire
and a unilateral- withdrawal of American troops, North
Vietnam refused to negotiate. They intended to win the
war. The failure of negotiating with Hanoj- frustrated
Nixon who saw it as a setback in endlng the war before the
L912 el-ections .
To Nj-xon Vietnam "overshadowed everything e1se, all
the time, in every discussion, in every opportuni_t.y, in
every problem" (MacMiIIan, 200J, p. 120) . Nixon had
promised peace with
that was what he was
Nixon knew his
honor during the electlon campaign and
ending the
Vietnam dileflrma. He and Kissinger
war had done to the United States
also knew the damage the
internationally as wel-l
as at home. The Soviets were watching with pleasure as a
superpower was failing to crush the smal-l developing North
Vi-etnam. At the same time they were advancing their
nuclear weapon capabif it j-es and expanding their military.
Nixon was very reluctant to become involved in Middle
East negotiations. "For Nixon and Kissinger, the Middte
East was like a j iqsaw puz zle with mi-ssing and rnisshapen
pieces" (Dall-ek, 200J, p. 171). The State Department was
interested i-n the admi-nistration pursuing a more assertive
going to deliver.
reelection depended on
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Middle East policy while Nixon felt more attention was
needed in vietnam. Nixon needed to appease the state
Department, but it also made him less inclined to rely on
the depart.ment to manage Middle East strategy. Nixon
followed the Stat.e Department persistence to hotd Four
Power tal-ks that included proposals for fsraeli-Jordanian
and fsraeli-Eqyptian settlements. fsraeli Prime Minister
"Golda Meir called it 'appeasement of the Arabs, and tLhe
gravest blows to rsrael's most. vital interests"' (Da11ek,
20A1, p. 179).
Richard Nixon believed that "[1]ife for everyone is a
series of crises" (Mazlish, 19J3, p. BB). Leaders are abl_e
to act in crises and t'. . . a l-eader without crisis is
almost a contradiction in terms" (Mazlish, L913, p. gZ) .
The President. felt t.hat all great leaders thrive on
challenge and are best when the going is hardest. He
viewed the Vj-etnam conf l-ict, and the Middle East
difficulties as exhausting, but at the same t.ime
exhilarating.
Nixon's crisis l-eadership s ki1ls were even f urther
challenged when
U. S. and Great
the Soviet Union threatened to surpass the
Britain in nuclear capabilities. In 1963,
Presj-dent Kennedy signed an aqreement with the Soviets and
England to limit atmospherj-c testing of nucl-ear weapons.
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This was the only treaty to date. In November L969, Nixon
proposed to the Sovi-et Uni-on a f ixed value standard. Each
was to possess enough arms to guarantee the dest.ruction of
the other, thus preventing either from starting war. Afters
a long deadl-ock, the first results of SALT I came in May
1917 with signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and
certain standards with respect to limitations of strategic
offensi-ve arms. This helped to improve cooperation between
the United States and the SovieLs.
Nixon was very interested in continuing tal-ks with the
soviet union and beginning dialogue with china. He
established 1i-nes of secret communication beti,ueen the U. S.
and China through secret i-ntermediaries in Romania and
Pakistan known only to Kissinger and hlmself.
He felt this secrecy was necessary because Congress
wanted the vietnam issue settled before embarking on
relations with China. The conflict. with Vietnam, which he
had hoped to be resolved within the first six months of his
presidency,
the war in
however, dragged on. Instead of winding down,
I ndochina was escalating into Laos and
was convinced that negotiationsCambodia. Nixon, who
shoul-d always be carried out from a position of strength,
approved B-52 raids against northern Laos and their
sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia. Domestj-c pressures for
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troop reduction and Cabinet memher disapproval of expanding
the war outside of Vietnam convinced the President to
deliver a progress toward peace address to the nation on
April 20 , 791 0 .
of Vietnamization
enemy activlty in
said, required an
In the address, Nixon credited his program
as succeeding, despite problems with
Laos and Cambodia.
-JJ-
aggressive military
Such activity, Nj-xon
response. fn order
promised another
next twel-ve months.
to appease anti-war protesters, Nixon
troop wlthdrawal of 150,000 over the
With his approval raLing increase from fifty-five percent
t.o sixty-two percent after the April 20 speech, Nixon was
more confident to complete his next move.
In early ApriI, Nixon met secretly with Admiral John
McCain, father of Senator John McCain of Arl zona, who
reinforced the Presi-dent' s belief that if North Vietnamese
forces were not stopped they would soon take Cambodia's
capitol- Phnom Penh and continue further. The President
felt that if the U.S. forces joined with the South
Vietnamese army, the Communists could be driven out of
Cambodia. On April 26, Nixon authorized an attack on enemy
forces in Cambodia against the advice of his entire White
House organization. Defense Secretary Laird had predicted
that the Cambodia operat ion would not be deci s i-ve and Hanoi
would replace its l-osses. The Secretary proved to be
correct. The invasion not only fail-ed to inspire
confidence in Vietnamization, it emphasized Nixon's
ineffectiveness during periods of stress. Within a two-
month period t.he United States and South Vietnamese armed
forces withdrew, allowing North vietnam to take back
prevj-ously lost areas and wj-den their control of northeast
Cambodla.
Throughout the ordeal, Nixon released his stress in
b:-zarre behavior. According to Kissinger, * [t]here was no
true Nixon" (DaIIek, 2001, p. 206) . "There was a
ref lective, philosophical, stoical N j-xon; and there was an
impetuous, impulsive, and erratic one" ( Dallek , 200J , p.
206). Nixon viewed the Cambodi-an episode as a test of his
manhood and resilience to stress.
"Nixon's fhighest priority] in the aftermath of
Cambodia was not to consolidate or expand al-l-eged gains
against the Communists, but to qulet dissent in the United
States and repel congressj-onal- attacks on executive power"
(Dallek, 200J, p. 207). The Presldent, however,
experienced anoLher nightmare as a result of the Cambodian
failure, when Ohio National- Guard troops opened
students during
campus, killing
This triggered
a war protest on the Kent State
four and wounding nine on May 4
other protests around the country. Nlxon
fire at
Univers i t y
, 1970.
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tried to make peace with himself by visiting student
protesters gathered at the Lincoln Memorlal- on the early
morning of May B. He tried to find a common bond with the
crowd through which he could express his concerns.
rnstead, the President digressed to sub-jects that had
nothing to do with concerns about. the war and direction of
American foreign poficies. Nixon wanted to reach out and
express his feelings, but could not. Richard Nixon was too
preoccupied with internal- turmoil to listen.
By late 1970, Richard Nixon had faced overwhelming
probrems that Lested hlm physically and emotionally.
Despite his resolve to end the Vietnam War, the war raged
on. Nixon f elt that unl-ess he could improve his public
standing by convincing voters that he was ending the war/
hi s 791 2 re-elect ion woul-d be doubt f ul . The Pres ident
j-nstructed his White House staff to make efforts to present
the admini-stration in a positive way. Nixon wanted to be
remembered as a peacemaker, rescuing the world from
corTrmuni st tyranny.
191L, Nixon wasBy
he began
not only distrustful of the media;
allegiances of his aids. The
staff to make memos of their
to question the
President instructed his
conversations. Later Nixon aides Haldeman and Alexander
Butterfield hrelped the President lnstal-1 a taping system
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that would secretly record office and telephone
conversations in various White House locations and at Camp
instant and accurateDavid, In this way, Nixon
information for historical
accountabl-e for what they
woul-d have
purposes and to hold people
sald. The President could not
anticipate the way that his tapes would make history.
As Nixon's tapes indicate, the years l9l 1-1972 were
dominated with the President's preoccupation with being re-
elected and establishing "a foreign policy record advancing
international peace that would be the envy of al-l- future
presidents" (DaIlek , 200'7 , p. 247 ) .
As a presidential candidate in 7961 , Nixon wrote in an
article in States Foreign Affa-r-rs, t'Taking the long view,
we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of
the family of nations, Lhere to nurture its fantasies,
cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors" (MacMi11an,
2001 , p. 6 ) . The President sai-d, "the mark of a l-eader 'is
whether he can give hi story a nudgre' " (MacMil-l-an , 200'l , p .
5) .
Richard Nixon had the intel-ligence, the curiosity,
hacked by knowledge of history, to be able to take
advantage of changing world situati-ons. He believed that
through cooperation among nati-ons the suffering and expense
of wars could be prevented; that countries could someday
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work together for the good of al_I.
against conrmunism, but had come to
Nixon was always firmly
an understanding that
maintaining a balance in the world was more important than
ideological struggles with adversaries. Unlike Secretary
of State John EosLer Dulles, who had publicly brushed past
Chou En-Iai's offered hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference,
Nixon, by L969 was ready for dialogue.
Hostilities that broke out in mid 1969 between Chinese
and Soviet troops in Northeast China gave N j-xon a chance to
The President knewplay one country against the other.
that he had to ma ke conces s ions to show U . S . s incerity j-n
normal:-zing relations. By recommendation of the National
Security Council and the State Department, Nixon announced
in April 1971 t.he lifting of twenty-year travel and trade
restrictions with China.
A few conservatives sensed that Nixon was yielding to
communism. The President, however, fe1t ". . that opening
to China was useful against the Soviets and would help in
Vietriam" (MacMil-l-an , 2007 , p. L73) . Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
anxious about improving Soviet/U. S. relations and unsure of
a possibl-e growing threat from Japan, invit.ed a U,S. table
tennis team which was playing in Japan to come to China.
"As Mao subsequently described his decisj-on, the sma11
ping-pong ball could be used to move the large ball of the
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earth" (MacMillan , 2OO1, p. 17B) . Premier Chou En-Lai
received the team, signifying that Nixon's overtures had
been acknowledged. The President in turn invited the
Chinese table tennis team to the United States '
Nixon
keepi ng
advi s or s
the
and Kissinger's back channel secret diplomacy/
State Department and most of Nj-xon's own
uninformed caused unnecessary delays and Confusion
in Serious negotiations, "[Nixon] needed crj-sis to feel
alive" ( Barber, 7992 , p . 1 42) . Fortunately, at the end of
ApriI 1971, Chou En-Lai responded to the Presidents' five-
month-o1d secret messages with a personal- invitation from
Chairman Mao for Nixon to visit China. Progress for
restored rel-ations conLinued. The United States wit.hdrew
its opposition to China joining the United Nations, but
resisted the expulsion of Taiwan. On July 15, L917, Nlxon
spoke to a national audience about his forthcoming visit to
China the next year.
\\ 7t ^ 
'N j-xon I told Kis s inger, l Nations must have greatl:1.D L
ideas or they cease to be great' " (MacMillan , 200'7 , p . 10 ) .
Richard Nixon's great idea was to become a worl-d statesman
and build permanent world peace. The President had the
i-ns ight and understanding to do so as he met and clasped
hands for the first time with Premier Chou En-Lai on
February 11. 1972. It was the first step in formally
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normal-:-zing rel-ations between the United States and the
People's Republic of China.
As with most foreign affairs negotiations, Nixon
insisted that talks between the Chinese leaders and the
American President be shrouded in secrecy. Three hours
after his arrival, Nixon was summoned for a short meeLing
with Chairman Mao. Nixon then traveled throughout Chi-na.
At the conclusion, both governments issued the Shanghai
Communiqu6 | a basis for Sino-Amerj-can relations that was
followed for many years. In the official communiqu6, both
nations pledged to work toward ful1 normal-ization of
diplomatic relations, Both pledged. *[t]here is one China.
. . and Ta j-wan is part of China" (MacMillan , 2001 , p. 25 g ) .
This assurance continues t.oday, ds President Georqe W. Bush
opposes j-ndependence for Taiwan.
Nixon's request for Chinese assistance with a peaceful
withdrawal- of Ameri-cans from Vietnam was turned down. The
President's anxiety regarding leaving South Vietnam before
the L912 el-ections with a reasonable chance for their
survival- was still not assured. Nj-xon, however, did return
from China with an outpouring of praise from both political-
parties as well as the nation.
The Soviet Union, which had warned Nixon in 1969 that
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. it would be a 'very grave miscalculation' if
.someone' in the United States were tempted to profit from
the rift between China and the Soviet Union at the latter's
expense" (MacMillan, 2007, p. 2Bg) , now became more
visit to Moscow to negotiate and sign
ten f ormal agreements, the most J-mportant being the
Nixon had hopesNuclear-Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT I
for a joint U.S.S.R. and U.S. space venture in 1975.
The Moscow Summit produced a negotiated secret grain
deal as well as an agreement for a peaceful resolution of
conf licts, pdrticul-arly in the Middle East, which
ultimately did not materialize. The f inal- product of
Nixon's detente leadership was a conference in HeIsinki.
The f ocus was to be reduction of Cold War risks, tensi-ons
amenable to i-mproved
May 191 2 Nixon paid a
and costs in Europe. Nixon
that the conf erence woul-d be
were much more optimistic.
7, 1975 members of NATO and
future security of Europe.
August 1975 were nonbindi.g,
the Soviet Union and Eastern
relations with the United States. In
and Kissinger were pessimistic
successful whereas Europeans
Between July 3, 791 3 and August
the Warsaw Pact discussed the
The Helsinki Accords, s j-gned
-l_n
lacked treaty status, and gave
Europe legitimate standing as
equals with the democrat j-c regimes in the West, but they
also addressed human rights. These Accords would be
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referenced hy many of the'tNew thinkers" in the soviet
Union, such as Gorbachev, and it can be debated that they
were a signj-ficant catalyst in the fal-l- of communism.
Nixon's successes
mil-itary sophistication
Vietnam provided him an
American military. The
increased the benefits
with the communist world and the
he gained from the trials of
opport.unity to modern LZe the
President ended the draft and
of an aII-volunteer army.
Ni-xon had beenSince the beginning of his
searching for a way to get the
Vietnam. He did not. want to be
Vietnam, but could not convince
accused of abandoning South
the Nort.h Vi-etnamese to
presidency,
United States out of
negotiate. Nixon tried to use the improved rel-ations wlth
china and the soviet union to pressure the North. The
President used Lhreats, periodic bombing and signs of
personal irrational behavior to bring the North to a
settlement . Nothing worked. when Ni-xon used bombing
operations, positive results were short last.ing and in the
end the cofitmunists occupied more territory. Clearf y, North
Vietnam was in control of the warr wditing for the right
time to make a peace proposal.
Throughout the ordeal, Nixon was not honest with the
American people. Publicly, the President continued to
stress that the combination of negotiation and his program
-41 -
of training the south vietnamese to take over the
responsibilities for their own country were working ' In
october 1912, counting on Nixon to settl-e before the
?residential election, Hanoi proposed an agleement which
was quickly accepted by Kissinger. When the South obj ect'ed
the North began broadcasting provisions that both Nixon and
Kj_ssinger wanted to keep secret, especially with elections
less than one month away. In late October Kissinger
announced, t'Peace is at hand" (Nixon, 200J, p. 5) without
giving details. After the election, Nixon persuaded South
Vietnamese President Thieu to participate in a settlement.
On January 2J , 191 3 Nixon
Vietnam War, achieving his
peacemaker" ( DalIek , 2007 ,
ended U.S. participation in the
t'indj-spensability as a
p. 578).
From the Pinnac].e Down L972-1994
Until his re-el-ect j-on on January 20 , L91 3, Richard
Nixon's bel-ief that t'hard effort could bring success"
(Barber, 1992, p. 741) rang true. Nixon was a good manager
as Vice President in the Eisenhower admi-nistration and
effective change agent/ transformational leader in his
first term as President. Nixon' s character was intact.
The President was renominated 1n 7972. He was
invigorated by his China and Soviet Union successes and at
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the peak of his PoPularitY.
McGovern, on the other hand,
Democratic candidate George
was proposing Pofj-cies that
of most of the electorate"the left"placed him far to
(GreensLein, 2004, p.103). **After the Democrats had
settled on McGovern, the po11s suggested Nixon was
2OO'7 , p. 4 08 ) . Nixon, however, didn' tunbeatable" ( Da1Iek'
trust the PoIls, fearing
him from the presidencY.
motion itlegal activities
Reelect the President.
that el-ect ion result s could oust
The President's anxieties set in
by members of the Commj-ttee to
Richard Nixon defeated his Democratj-c challenger by
one of the largest maj orities in the history of American
President.ial elections . Time Magaz ine made him 'Man of the
Year" in its January 1973 issue. Nixon's ambitions were to
continue d6tent.e wit.h the Soviet Unlon and come to
settlements in the Middl-e East. Watergate changed the
Presi-dent.s' p1ans. What started out as " . . . a minor
scandal burgeoned into a momentous catastrophe" (Aiken,
L996, p.5) ending in President Nixon's resignation in
disgrace.
Disgrace of Presidential Resig:lation
Less than a month after Nixon's visit to the sovlet
union, five men connected to the President.'s campaign
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committee and hired by some of Nixon's closest advisors
were arrested while burglari ztnq and installing hidden
microphones in the
Watergate building.
Democratic campaign office of the
As the news sPread, connecting the
burg I a rs
inc i dent
to the Nixon White House, aides began to treat the
as a public relations disaster. A full cover up
was the means chosen to deal wit.h the situation insLead of
objectivity. The White House and Nixon's campaign
committee shredded documents and evaded or refused to
truthfully answer reporters
dispel a larger picture of
Even though he was at
polls were showing he was
questions, thus attempting to
potential corruption.
the height of his popularity and
unbeatable, Nixon felt he had to
take steps to
late. Nixon
assure his presidency before it was too
could not al1ow power to go beyond his
control, and he obstructed t.he Federal Bureau of
Investigation from examining payments made to indicted
burglars to keep them quiet.
Investigators, however, began to unravel crimes
committed before and after the break-in. Testimony before
the SenaLe Sel-ect Committee on Presidential Campalgn
Activities revealed that the President directed White House
council John Dean to oversee the cover-up to conceal the
Administration' s involvement.. White House aid Alexander
-44-
Butterfield revealed that extensj-ve tape recordings existed
of conversations held in Nixon' s offices.
When special prosecutor Archibald Cox asked for the
tapes to be released, Nixon offered Lranscripts instead-
when cox re j ected the of f er, Ni-xon f ired him. other high
officials in his administration resigned rather than comply
wlth the order to fire Cox. 'tNixon's 'credibility and
moral authority' was Causing an 'agoni-z).ng j-nch by inch-
. attrition' of his presidential power" (Datlek , 200'1 , p.
5 67 ) . To compound his problefrs, Vj-ce-President Agnew
resigned amldst charges of wrongdoing as governor of
Maryland. Gerald R. Ford I a popular congressman from
Michigan was selected to succeed Agnew. In March L914t a
federal grand j ury named Richard Nixon as an unindicted co-
conspirator in a conspiracy to obstruct j ustice in the
V,[atergate
as special-
s ur rende r
investigation. Leon Jaworski, who replaced Cox
Watergate prosecutor, continued to demand the
of White House tapes as the House Judiciary
against theCommittee began
Pres ident .
to build an impeachment case
Richard Nixon tried to re-establish his presidential
authority by t.aking trips to the Middl-e East and Soviet
Union in the spring and suflrmer of 791 4 . Nixon t ried to
assist Israel with emerging aid when Egypt and Syria
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attacked and tried to take back land rsrael had seized in
the six-day war of 1961 . Nixon's efforts were met with an
embargo on oil- shiPments
Middle East.
The President was so
Ieft Kissinger in charge
one capitol- to the other
to the Unlted States from the
distracted by Watergate that he
of shuttle diplomacY going from
seeking agreements. In the Soviet
Union, SALT II negotiations did not go well. Brezhnev and
Gromyko were angry about being left out in the latest
Middle East tal-ks. "Conservative Republi-cans believed that
any arms agreement coming out of the next summit would be
aimed less at serving the nation's security than saving
Nixon's presidency" (Dallek, 200J , p. 559) . The obstacles
that Nlxon faced made significant advances for a successful
summit lmpossihle.
Nixon tried to hold on to his l-ifelong philosophy of
not giving up to defeat.
him upon his return home.
flnalty subrnitted was the
the President ordering the
Watergate, howeverr
One recording that
"smoking gun": the
EBI
closed in on
the President
recording of
to stop
2001 , p
the investigation of
the Watergate break-in (Dal1ek, 601) . With this
recording, President Nj-xon lost all political- support as
the Judiciary Committee recoilunended impeachment to the full
Flouse of Representatives. The Nixon presidency was over.
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Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, I914, to take
effect at noon the next day'
Henry Kissinger said of Nixon: "[h]e fe]t toward him
.a great tenderness-for the tremendous struggle he had
fought within his complex personality, for his
vulnerability, and for his great aspirations defeated in
the end by weakness of character' " (Dallek , 200-7 , p. 508-
60e).
On Sunday,
tel-evision
Watergate
September B, President Ford went on
and radio, explained that he wished to put
behind and the terrible divi s i-on
it had created,
the country
and read his proclamatlon of a 'ful1,
free, and absolute pardon' for Nixon (Black, 2007, p.
990. ) .
Nixon's agreed statement said in part that he hoped Ford's
tt'compassionate act' would ease 'the burden of Watergale"'
(Bl-ack, 2007 , p. 990 ) . Nixon never acknowledged
wrongdoing. "For him surrender is suicide, dn admission of
guilt and weakness" (Renshon, 1975, p. 446).
Richard Nixon kept a low prof il-e in retirement, trying
to rehabilitate his image. He wrote many books, most on
foreign policy, drawlng scholars' attention, but doing
little to affect policy. The President died in 1994,
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hoping that history woutd bestow to him what Nixon felt was
the greatest honor: the title of Peacemaker.
Implications for LeadershiP
What wiII Richard
l-eadership?
raised in a f ami 1y whe re
familiarity with crisis
operate in societY
field of politics.
and,
political ranks by using
Nixon's legacY teach us about
a complicated leader, having been
crisis seemed ever Present - His
gave Richard a base upon which to
more specifj-calIy, in his chosen
Nixon was
In Nixon'sthen solve.
opportunity
taking the
Nixon rose rapidly through the
or creating crises that he could
favor was the fact that he had the
to learn several roles in
nation's highest political
government before
office.
By the time he became Vice President, Richard Nixon
was the administration's general- political expert, having
the most thorough knowl-edge of governmental process, As
second-in-command under President Eisenhower. Nixon
s k11lf u1ly f ulf illed the transactional leadership roles
that he was given. When Eisenhower was hospitalized, the
by presiding overprot oco IVice Pres j-dent, observed proper
Cabinet meetings from the Vice President's chair and
conducted business from his office in the Capitol. Nixon
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made efforts to provid,e leadership without appearing to
lead.
By the time he became President, Nixon had formulated
a r. clear visi-on and direction" as described by steven covey
(1991, p. 69) . He was a transformational- leader/ change
agent who had
coul-d l ive in
a vision that the international comfiIunity
affairs expertise to
hetween nations.
The president used his foreign
try to bring a balance of Power
President Nixon's personal life consisted of battles
within himself . The t'compulsive tendency to press an
advantage" ( Chesen , 1-97 3 , p, 1_23 ) using illegal, and
unconstitutional means t.o assure his presidency in 1-912 ,
cosL Nixon the presldency. Watergate became the sobering
endpoint of the President's lifelong struggle with his
complex personality. Nixon' s nobl-e ambitions were def eated
by weakness of character.
Implications For Dfy Understanding of Leadership
Richard Nixon's leadershlp style added a twist to my
understanding of transformational leadershlp- Prior to
t.his study I understood Nixon to be a change aqent,
form of asometimes thought of as
trans f ormational- ]eader .
a negative
In his first term, however, Nixon
peace.
-49-
had a vision and a sense of ulgency for international
cooperation to prevent another war, by initiating ambitious
positive relati-ons with the soviets, china, and also
achieving significant domestic refolms ' Nixon' s love for
his country and the positive impact of hls visionary
outcomesr however, were undermined by his shortcomings'
Nixon secretly manipulated his powers and disregarded laws,
especi-al1y in his second term in of f ice. He prolonged the
Vietnam War to avoid the inevitable loss i-n his term in
office, thus allowing pain and suffering of those connected
with the conflict to continue. The President dismissed
Vrlatergate as t'a third-rate burglarY" (Dallek, 2001 , p. 622)
and never acknowledged his harmful and illegal acLions. In
his second term in of f ice, when his count.ry needed him t.o
fol-low through on a positive course domestically and
internationally, Richard Nj-xon failed. Leaders must have
strong convictions, be consistent and admit. when they are
wrong. President Nixon was a transformational leader, but
his character f l-aws, including a lack of ethics, gave him a
place in history as one of t.he most notorious presldents in
American history.
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